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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY-LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE-
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IGNORES BRITISH AT-
TEMPT TO EXERCISE IMPLIED VETO POWER OF LUXEMBOURG
COMPROMISE
On May 18, 1982, the Council of the European Community
adopted a proposal for a 10.4% farm price increase, disregarding
an attempted British veto of the measure.' The British voted
against the proposal primarily as a means of protesting the sepa-
rate, unresolved issue of the United Kingdom's budget contribu-
tion' to the European Community (EC). S The British claimed au-
thority to exercise de facto veto power under the Luxembourg
Compromise,4 a seventeen year-old joint statement on EC Council
See 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 5) 7-9 (1982).
See The Day Britain's Bluff Was Called, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1982, at 77 [hereinafter
cited as ECONOMIST]. Disagreement over the United Kingdom's budget contribution to the
EC has been a perennial problem from the time the United Kingdom joined the Commu-
nity. The British feel they have not received a fair return on their contribution to Commu-
nity operating expenses. A temporary settlement of the issue was made a week after the
May 18 majority vote, with further agreement that the question of a more permanent settle-
ment would be taken up later. (Euromarket News] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) No. 699, at 1
(June 9, 1982).
' European economic cooperation was formalized in the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (unof-
ficial English version) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
' Arrangements made in Luxembourg between the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six on
January 31, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 316 [hereinafter cited as Luxembourg Compromise]. The Luxem-
bourg Compromise sets forth four important provisions with regard to Council decision-
making:
1. In the event of decisions that can be adopted by majority on the proposal of
the Commission, when very important interests of one or several partners are
at stake, the members of the Council will attempt, within a reasonable period
of time, to arrive at solutions that could be adopted by all members of the
Council in respect of their mutual interests and those of the Community, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty.
2. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that,
when very important interests are concerned, discussion must be continued
until unanimous agreement has been reached.
3. The six delegations acknowledge that a difference of opinion remains on what
should be done in the event that conciliation cannot be fully attained.
4. The six delegations nonetheless consider that this difference of opinion does
not prevent the resumption, according to normal procedure, of the Commu-
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decision-making formulated by the original six EC Member States"
in 1966. The Council's adoption of the proposal surprised the Brit-
ish, who had relied on the veto power the Compromise was thought
to lend a Council Member's "no" vote on any important issue.' Ig-
noring this British appeal to the Luxembourg Compromise, the
Council utilized the majoritarian voting scheme codified in article
1481 of the EEC Treaty, and adopted the proposal over strong
British protests. This Recent Development will review the status of
the Luxembourg Compromise in EC decision-making in the after-
math of the Council's action in May 1982. 15 BULL. EUR. COMM.
(No. 5) 7-9 (1982).
By the qualified majority voting procedure prescribed in article
148,1 the Council may enact certain EC Commission proposals
which then become binding EC legislation.9 Beginning in 1966,
however, an unofficial practice of seeking unanimity developed
alongside the official procedure set forth in article 148.10 This una-
nity's work.
Id. at 317.
' The original six signatories of the EEC Treaty, supra note 3, were France, Italy, Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
See ECONOMIST, supra note 2, at 77.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 148. Article 148 sets out the "qualified majority" concept
of majoritarian voting for the Council's adoption of EC Commission proposals. Under the
article 148 formula, a qualified majority is obtained by gathering the determined amount of
weighted votes necessary to enact a Commission proposal. Id. The voting scheme has been
reformulated to accommodate the increased membership of the EC over the last decade; the
most current reformulation appears in the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of
the Hellenic Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291)
art. 14, at 19 (1979), which provides that:
Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its mem-
bers shall be weighted as follows:
B elgium ...................... 5 G reece ........................ 5
D enm ark ...................... 3 Italy ......................... 10
Germany ..................... 10 Luxem bourg ................... 2
France ....................... 10 Netherlands ................... 5
Ireland ....................... 3 United Kingdom .............. 10
For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least: -45 votes in favour
where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, -45 votes in favour, cast by at least six members, in other cases.
8 See supra note 7.
See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 189; see generally E. NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER 3-
13 (1977) (explanation of the relationship between the Council and the Commission in the
EC).
'o On most proposals, voting is theoretically to proceed on the "qualified majority" prin-
ciple as set forth in article 148. Since 1966, however, unanimity has been required when a
Member State holds a very important interest in the proposal then before Council. See J.
GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1973, at 393-94 (1974). For a detailed
explanation of the Council's highly complex majoritarian voting scheme, see 2 COMMON
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nimity practice was the historical offspring of an EC decision-mak-
ing dispute in June 1965, which deteriorated into one of the grav-
est political and institutional crises ever faced by the EC." Sharp
disagreement over a 1965 agricultural proposa 12 then before Coun-
cil led to a walk-out by the French delegation. s After a six-month
absence of that delegation from the Council,"' the crisis was finally
resolved by two special Council meetings held in Luxembourg in
1966.' 5 These meetings produced the Luxembourg Compromise,1 6 a
joint statement by the six EC Council members which advanced
the principle of decision-making by unanimity for the Council
when important interests were at stake. 7
Although the Luxembourg Compromise was never a legally bind-
ing enactment, 8 the principle of unanimity which it introduced
gradually supplanted the Council's majoritarian voting proce-
dure.'9 Except for proposals concerning the EC's budget or admin-
istration of its internal affairs, all important Council decisions
since 1966 have been reached by informal, unanimous consent and
not by qualified majority voting. 0 While remaining the product of
informal accord, the unanimity practice had become so pervasive
within the Council in the following years that at the Paris Summit
in December 1974, the EC Heads of Government issued a commu-
niqu612 acknowledging and addressing the role of the unanimity
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 4416.
" E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPEC-
Tim 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as E. STEIN].
" The 1965 agricultural proposal was part of a package that included a financing measure
that would have expanded the powers of the European Parliament. France was opposed to
this expansion of power, while the other five Member States favored it. See Thompson, The
European Economic Community After the 1965 Crisis, 16 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1-3 (1967).
'3 The French walk-out was a demonstration of the "empty chair" policy. This term does
not indicate a secession. Rather, it means that the vacating member will abide by existing
agreements, but will not participate in producing new legislation from that point on. See E.
STEmN, supra note 11, at 63.
" In the interim period between the walk-out and the extraordinary Council meetings in
Luxembourg, the remaining five Member States of the EC continued to meet in the Council.
Thompson, supra note 12, at 3.
" Id. at 4.
" See Luxembourg Compromise, supra note 4, at 316.
"7 Id. para. 2, at 317.
" See 4 H. SmIrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE EEC 5-120 to 5-121 (1976).
10 Id. at 5-122.
30 Id.
" Final Communiqu6 of the Meeting of the Heads of Government, Paris, December 9-10,
1974, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 8 GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIvrTIES OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, point 6, at 298 (1975).
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principle in EC Council decision-making."
Frequent appeal to the Luxembourg Compromise has come
about despite incipient disagreement over its precise scope and ap-
plication. As a result of intentional ambiguity written into the
Luxembourg Compromise," the scope of the veto power which the
unanimity practice implies is difficult to define. Chronicling the EC
Council's application of these procedures is also a difficult task be-
cause the EC Council follows a principle of confidentiality which
prevents disclosure of its actual voting patterns. 4
" The Communiqu6 expresses the opinion that the unanimity practice need not always
be resorted to in EC Council decision-making. Id.
" Paragraph 1 of the Luxembourg Compromise states that Members of the Council will
attempt, "within a reasonable period of time", to arrive at solutions which could be adopted
by all members of Council, while paragraph 2 states the French position that discussions
must be continued however long it takes to arrive at unanimous agreement. Luxembourg
Compromise, supra note 4, at 317.
Differences of interpretation existed not only among the original members in 1966, but
continued to be a problem when the United Kingdom joined the EC in the following decade.
According to historians of the 1970-71 negotiations of the United Kingdom's accession
treaty to the EEC, succeeding British governments enthusiastically endorsed the Luxem-
bourg Compromise and its implied veto power as part of Britain's pro-accession campaigns
of that period. A misconception arose among the British public, however, that the veto
power was Community law, and not the matter of generally respected custom that it is.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, BACKGROUND REPORT, No. ISEC/B24/82, June 3, 1982,
at 2-3.
I" The Luxembourg Compromise is an informal accord, not a binding legal document. See
A. PARRY, EEC LAW 37-38 (1973). It espouses a principle that encourages negotiation to-
wards unanimity, (Luxembourg Compromise, supra note 4, para. 1, at 317), and thus, by
implication, circumnavigation of the article 148 majoritarian voting process. An appeal for
unanimity chiefly affects the negotiating phase of Council decision-making, rather than the
voting phase. The Council's actions throughout this process, however, are cloaked by a prin-
ciple of confidentiality, which does not allow disclosures to be made. See 4 H. SMIT & P.
HERZOG, supra note 18, at 5-123. Information which might mention use of the unanimity
practice is "difficult to obtain." Id.; cf. ECONOMIST, supra note 2, at 78 (simply stating that
the veto has been used "four or five times" since 1966, without further elaboration). The
historical application of the Luxembourg Compromise in EC Council decision-making is dif-
ficult to chronicle, but in the case of the veto power, lack of information should not necessa-
rily be construed as lack of use. First, being a political negotiating tool rather than a legal
procedure, it can affect EC decision-making in the form of a mere threat during the negoti-
ating phase, (4 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 18, at 5-123), a phenomenon which does
not lend itself to empirical analysis. Second, owing to the Council's avowed general accept-
ance of the unanimity practice, (see supra text accompanying note 20), and the application
of the confidentiality rule in Council decision-making, (see 4 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra
note 18, at 5-123), it may be inferred that no news from the Council simply confirms that
the unanimity practice is being used.
The importance of the Luxembourg Compromise is not confined solely to procedural mat-
ters. It is equally significant as a political statement in the context of EC historical develop-
ment. According to one authority, the Luxembourg Compromise may be seen as one practi-
cal expression of the unwillingness of EC Member States to submit themselves fully to the
EC "integrating process." Id. at 5-124. The concept of integration refers to the process by
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Estimation of the effects of the Council's 1982 action upon the
future status of the Luxembourg Compromise is, however, facili-
tated by a review of available information on the appeals to the
unanimity principle in 1966 and 1982.25 In 1982, when the Council
ignored a British appeal to the unanimity practice and approved a
proposal by majority vote,2 6 a presumption was raised that the
Luxembourg Compromise had been abandoned in favor of article
148 for Council's decision-making. Other facts, however, indicate
differences between the 1966 French and 1982 British appeals for
unanimity. These differences suggest that, in 1982, the Council was
not rejecting the Luxembourg Compromise, but instead was re-
jecting an inappropriate British use of the Compromise's unanim-
ity principle, which exceeded its original bounds delimited by the
1965 crisis. For example, the French in 1965 were prepared to walk
out of the Council to underscore their opposition, 7 and ultimately
did so; in May 1982 it was clear to all of Britain's fellow members
that historical exigencies2 s made a British walk-out impracticable.
More importantly, the French opposed the 1965 agricultural pro-
posal because it was linked 29 to a revenue measure which carried
strong implications for the whole EC;30 the British only opposed
the 1982 proposal after linking it with an outside issue of immedi-
ate political concern only to the United Kingdom.3
which EC Member States gradually yield sovereign authority to the EC. See Rosenthal &
Puchala, Decisional Systems, Adaptiveness, and European Decision-Making, in THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY AFTER 20 YEARS 60, 61 (P. Laurent ed. 1978).
" Compare Thompson, supra note 12, at 1-9 (narrative of the 1966 crisis), with 15 BULL.
EUR. COMM. (No. 5) 7-9 (1982) (action of Council majority in 1982).
, See 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 5) 7-9 (1982).
If the French had waited to bring about a crisis after they had been outvoted on the
1965 proposal, they might have found themselves in an untenable legal position in the Com-
munity. S. HOLT, THE COMMON MARKET 69 (1967).
" In May of 1982, Britain was waging war in the Falklands and was in no position to walk
out or levy retaliatory sanctions upon the members of the Council majority because the EC
Council was, at that time, honoring British-requested sanctions against Argentina. 15 BULL.
EUR. COMM. (No. 4) 7 (1982).
" The proposal was packaged in such a way that Council approval of the agricultural
measure would have automatically included approval of a general revenue scheme which was
attached, or "linked," to the original proposal. See S. HOLT, supra note 27, at 69-70. France
was opposed both to the agricultural proposal, and to the revenue measure linked to it.
o Acceptance of the revenue scheme would have yielded more power from the Member
States to the European Parliament, a result which France strongly opposed. See Thompson,
supra note 12, at 1-3. Approval of this linked measure would have constituted a further step
towards EC "supranationalism" in the eyes of the French. Id. at 2. Theoretically, every
Member State, not just France, would have been affected by such a political shift of power
to Parliament away from the Member States. Id.
See ECONOMIST, supra note 2, at 77.
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Thus far, the consequences of the 1982 Council action bear out
the inference that the British veto was ignored because, in the eyes
of the other Council members, the circumstances were inappropri-
ate for appeal to the Luxembourg Compromise. After the adoption
of the 1982 agricultural proposal by a formal vote, no formal state-
ment amending or disavowing the Luxembourg Compromise's una-
nimity principle was issued.,32 Certain political considerations may
account for the apparent willingness of the Council to leave the
Compromise in its informal, but important, posture alongside arti-
cle 148.'a Historically, the EC Council has sought to balance the
concern that a codified veto could paralyze Council decision-mak-
ing3' with the opposing concern that, in the absence of some kind
of veto power, individual national interests would be suppressed by
majoritarian voting.3 5 In the coming years, as the membership base
of the EC expands,36 and national interests diversify correspond-
ingly, 7 an implied veto power allowing occasional majority voting
could avoid the predicted increase in deadlocks that a codified veto
would precipitate.3 Alternatively, the implied veto power might
place pressure on the Council for a thorough conciliation of inter-
ests before reaching a decision."9
The future success of the Luxembourg Compromise in satisfying
these opposing concerns depends upon the scope of operation the
EC Council allows the unanimity practice in the decision-making
process. While the precise scope of operation intended for the Lux-
embourg Compromise has never been clear, the Council's 1982 ac-
3' The Genscher-Columbo proposal for a European Act, (14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 11)
100 (1981)), asks only for a "clarification" of the process of appeal to the Luxembourg Com-
promise, but does not call for formal amendment of article 148 of the EEC Treaty, (supra
note 2), or for disavowal of the Luxembourg Compromise. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMIS-
SION, BACKGROUND REPORT, No. ISEC/B24/82, June 3, 1982, at 3. For a short discussion of
some proposals for changing EC Council decision-making procedure, see Kitzinger,
Problems of a European Political Economy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1970's 29,
48-50 (S. Warnecke ed. 1972).
8 France and West Germany insisted that the unanimity rule still stands. ECONOMIST,
supra note 2, at 78. French President Mitterand remarked that it was "up to Great Britain
to determine the nature of its continued role in the EEC." The Times (London), May 20,
1982, at 10, col. 2.
" See Final Communiqu6 of the Meeting of the Heads of Government, Paris, December
9-10, 1974, supra note 21, point 6, at 298.
" See Thompson, supra note 12, at 1-3.
Spain and Portugal are currently negotiating accession to the European Community. 15
BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 7/8) 56 (1982).
37 P. DAGTOGLOU, BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 224 (1975).
3S Id.
39 See supra note 24.
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tion has suggested limitations upon the application of the Compro-
mise which move towards defining, by implication, an acceptable
scope of operation for the unanimity practice in Council decision-
making. First, the implied veto power of the Luxembourg Compro-
mise may now be considered an inappropriate means for fashioning
linkage to an outside issue40 that directly concerns only the vetoing
party.4" Second, the threat to veto a proposal may not succeed
when it is perceived by other Council members that the member
calling for unanimity is not prepared to offer resistance4" to the
majority after the decision. Despite these limitations on the Lux-
embourg Compromise, however, the 1982 Council action has not
ended the utility of this informal accord in promulgating European
Community law.43
Kevin Mason
40 See S. HOLT, supra note 27, at 70.
See ECONOMIST, supra note 2, at 77.
4, See supra note 28.
See E. NomL, supra note 9, at 3-13.
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